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Dangerous duties: power, paternalism and
the ‘responsibility to protect’
PHILIP CUNLIFFE
Abstract. This article provides a critique of Louise Arbour’s article ‘The responsibility to
protect as a duty of care in international law and practice’. Proceeding through criticisms
of Arbour’s specific propositions, the thesis is advanced that the perverse effect of the ‘duty
of care’ is to undermine political accountability and by extension, political responsibility. It
is argued that this is an imperfect duty that no specific agent is obliged to fulfil. This poses
insuperable problems of agency that are exposed in Arbour’s efforts to actualise the
doctrine. As there is no mechanism for enacting the ‘duty of care’, I argue that it will be
powerful states that will determine the conditions under which the ‘responsibility to protect’
is discharged. This means that the ‘duty’ will remain tied to the prerogatives of states. In
order to resolve this problem of agency, it will be shown how Arbour is forced to replace
the idea of law with the principle of ‘might makes right’. The ‘duty of care’ is also shown
to have regressive effects on the domestic sphere: the demand that states be made
accountable to the international community ends up making states responsible for their
people rather than to their people.
Philip Cunliffe is a Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the
University of Kent. He joined the School in September 2009.
Introduction
In recent years the idea of the ‘responsibility to protect’ has won widespread
backing around the globe. The doctrine articulates a link between the management
of violence by the international community and a vision of the fundamental
elements of legitimate domestic rule. In her article ‘The responsibility to protect as
a duty of care in international law and practice’ Louise Arbour argues that the
‘vitality’ of the doctrine ‘flows from its inherent soundness and justice’.1 I will
argue here that the doctrine is neither sound nor just and that its vitality, such as
it is, stems not from its capacity to protect the wretched of the earth but from the
opportunity it offers states to extend the writ of their power both over their own
peoples and over other (weaker) states. Arbour’s article is a useful entry point into
the debate. The rigour of Arbour’s attempt to translate the ‘responsibility to
protect’ into a legally actionable ‘duty of care’ allows us to pursue the problems
with the doctrine to their logical conclusion. Criticisms of specific points in
Arbour’s argument establish a foundation for a more general critical discussion of
the doctrine.
1 Louise Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice’,
Review of International Studies, 34 (2008), p. 448.
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In its most basic form, the doctrine holds that if a state is unable or unwilling
to discharge its obligation to protect individuals against gross human rights
violations then the ‘onus of [such] protection falls by default upon the broader
international community, which is then called upon to step in and help, or [. . .]
even coerce States to put in place the requisite web of protection’.2 According to
Arbour, the appeal of the doctrine lies in its promise to privilege the suffering of
ordinary people above the interests and scheming of states. The doctrine will
strengthen the regime of international legal protection that is supposed to shield
imperilled humanity against ‘state-sponsored slaughter’.3 I will argue that the
‘responsibility to protect’ threatens to repress popular sovereignty and in so doing,
makes the exercise of power less rather than more responsible.
In her article Arbour identifies two types of opposition to the doctrine. The first
is those who claim we are ‘powerless’ to halt ‘gross violations of human rights’ in
far-off conflicts.4 The second is those whom Arbour calls the ‘custodians of the
orthodoxy of non-interference’, who worry that the ‘responsibility to protect’ will
foster a ‘moral imperialism’ granting powerful states a license to interfere in the
affairs of weaker states.5 Although Arbour’s dismissal of both these positions is
unconvincing,6 my argument here takes a different tack. I argue that the
‘responsibility to protect’ strengthens state power at the expense of popular power
within states and that ‘moral imperialism’ between states is a corollary of this effect.
Extending Arbour’s ‘web of protection’ across the planet with no single identifiable
authority responsible for keeping that web intact means that the ‘duty of care’ can
only be ‘imperfect’. ‘Imperfect’ because, in the words of Michael Walzer, it is ‘a
duty that doesn’t belong to any particular agent’.7 With only nebulous global
principles at stake, inevitably it is power that will determine the conditions under
2 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 448.
3 Ibid., p. 445.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 448.
6 Arbour criticises the claim that we are powerless in humanitarian crises by arguing that ‘the global
web of our interdependence’ makes any such claims redundant. The result is a fortuitous symmetry
between the needs of security and the demands of morality: ‘indifference or inaction in the
knowledge of violence, deprivation and abuse allow exclusion and resentment to fester [. . .]
conditions that will ultimately affect everybody’s rights, security and welfare’ – Arbour, ‘The
responsibility to protect’, p. 445. Here unspecified mechanisms of global integration function as a
deus ex machina that obviates the need for argument. This allows Arbour to sidestep concrete
analysis of actual conflicts. Yet the number of conflicts that have not seen intervention clearly
demonstrates that intervention is not an automatic by-product of globalisation – a range of
additional factors come into play before intervention actually occurs. In the second instance, Arbour
contests the so-called ‘orthodoxy of non-interference’ by arguing later in her article that the
‘responsibility to protect’ is already embedded in the provisions of existing international law
(Arbour, ibid., pp. 447–8). But this can only leave the reader wondering what precisely is ‘orthodox’
about the claims made by the ‘custodians of non-interference’. Arbour’s suggestion that the
‘responsibility to protect’ is part of the natural growth and progress of existing international law puts
her in the position of claiming the mantle of legal orthodoxy.
7 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations (New York:
Basic Books, 2000), p. xiii. Walzer is discussing humanitarian intervention rather than the
‘responsibility to protect’. Kok-chor Tan considers the same problem in relation to the ‘responsibility
to protect’ doctrine outlined in the 2001 report The Responsibility to Protect. Tan questions whether
humanitarian intervention meets the strict definition of ‘imperfect duty’ as understood by Kantian
scholars. Cf. Kok-chor Tan, ‘The Duty to Protect’, in Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (eds),
Humanitarian Intervention (New York and London: New York University Press, 2006), pp. 95–96.
He nonetheless accepts the designation, and for the sake of consistency I will follow him in doing
so.
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which a duty is discharged. Insofar as this differs from humanitarian intervention,
it will be for the worse. Invoking the ‘responsibility to protect’ will allow
interloping states to claim a higher authority than the merely selfish claim to a
‘right of intervention’.
In other words, the problem is not confined to international relations. The
attempt to embed a ‘duty of care’ into the definition of legitimate statehood warps
the principle of representative government. However noble the intent, if shielding
individuals from the most degraded forms of barbarism is to become a fundament
of legitimate statehood, this will have dangerous repercussions for the structure of
political relations between peoples and their states. If states are seen less as
emanating from their people’s will but rather as one apparatus among others for
the enforcement of disembodied global duties, this will dilute the relationship of
representation between a people and state. If the sovereign people are no longer the
sole legitimate arbiter of their state’s behaviour, this can only mean that the state
is less responsible to its people. Upholding a duty of care under the threat of
external sanction pushes representative government into the realm of paternalism,
wherein states have responsibilities for their people rather than to their people. In
other words, the doctrine fails on its own terms. Whatever the alleged ‘orthodoxy
of non-interference’ may be, it can be shown that the responsibility to protect
renders the exercise of power less accountable, and unaccountable power is
ultimately irresponsible power. Instead of disciplining states in favour of powerless
victims, I will show how the doctrine will allow states to evade political
responsibility.
Outline
The argument proceeds as follows. I begin by analysing Arbour’s account of how
the ‘responsibility to protect’ transforms a state’s prerogative to intervene in other
states into a duty to defend imperilled humanity. According to Arbour, making the
defence of imperilled humanity an obligation transforms it from a selfish act by a
single state into an altruistic function in line with the collective standards and
interests of the international community. However, as this duty can only be an
imperfect one, we shall see that there is an insurmountable problem of agency at
the core of the doctrine.8 I will argue that the enforcement of the ‘responsibility to
protect’ can only be discretionary – and hence there is no means of preventing the
selective and self-serving enforcement of the duty. Arbour struggles with the
implications of this problem, striking out in a number of directions in her search
to find a means by which she can ensure that the duty be realised.
I trace and criticise Arbour’s various manoeuvres through international law and
order, showing how the argument inexorably leads her to argue for expanding the
remit of powerful states and her resignation to the principle of paternalism. I take
issue with Arbour’s suggestion that the ‘responsibility to protect’ should exact
8 Note that this point is not restricted to questions of military or coercive intervention: the basic issue
is the same across the spectrum of possibilities that Arbour outlines as falling under the
responsibility to protect, ranging from help, through compellance to coercion. Arbour, ‘The
responsibility to protect’, p. 448.
Dangerous duties 81
heavier duties from powerful states, as this proposition segues into the idea that
might makes right – precisely the condition which law is supposed to curtail.
Building on the issue of agency, I go on to say that this problem extends to the
post-conflict engagement envisioned under the ‘responsibility to protect’, where the
diffusion of duties leads to the dilution of concrete responsibilities in transitional
administration. In the last third of the article, I put forward the case that a
consistent reading of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and its corollary of
non-intervention, remains the best way to discipline states and ensure that they
uphold their responsibilities.
From right to responsibility?
For Arbour, what lifts the ‘responsibility to protect’ over and above humanitarian
intervention that preceded it is the embrace of ‘the victims’ point of view and
interests’.9 In doing this the doctrine ditches the ‘questionable State-centred
motivations’ associated with the arguments regarding the so-called ‘right’ of
intervention.10 In place of a flexible ‘right of intervention’ that states can exercise
as and when they please, the ‘responsibility to protect’ erects a global and
‘permanent duty to protect individuals against abusive behaviour’.11 Arbour’s
reasoning seems to be that if the decision to intervene is always left to the
discretion of states, we can expect them to act against human rights abuses only
when it suits them. As a result, we have no means of extricating the moral good
of humanitarian intervention from the ‘questionable motivations’ that underpin
state action.12 If states are obliged to act however, whatever their underlying
motivations may be will become less important.13 This is one of the strong points
of the doctrine. On the one hand, the prerogatives of interloping states are limited
by the adoption of a more rigid policy that prevents them acting as and when they
please. On the other, the potential ‘recipients of international attention and action’
are left none the worse (that is, always subject to potential predation by more
powerful states).14 What is more, as would-be interveners are now bearers of a
duty, they can be held to account for their failure to act.15
There are two things immediately worth noting about Arbour’s presentation of
the doctrine. First, there is a sleight-of-hand in her treatment of humanitarian
intervention. Arbour concedes that humanitarian intervention is problematic, but
she locates the problem not where one might expect (that humanitarian interven-
tion violates state sovereignty), but rather in the fact that the intervener’s claim has
to be framed in the selfish terms of a right belonging to that state. Casting the
problem of humanitarian intervention in this way frees Arbour from having to
account for the link between sovereignty and non-intervention. In other words, she
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. Arbour also welcomes the way in which the ‘responsibility to protect’ systematises ‘post-conflict
engagement’ by the international community – an issue we shall return to below.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 447.
13 ‘No longer holders of a discretionary right to intervene, all States are no burdened with the
responsibility to take action under the doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect.’ Ibid., p. 449.
14 Ibid., p. 449.
15 Ibid., p. 450. As we see below, Arbour’s faith in these mechanisms is misplaced.
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has already tacitly privileged intervention. Second, this facilitates her presentation
of the ‘responsibility to protect’ as embodying normative progress. If the problem
with humanitarian intervention is its egotistical character, then a more communal
version of the same practice will be sufficient to rectify the problem. This would
indeed appear to be progress if we had correctly identified the problem with
humanitarian intervention.
Arbour muddies the waters further in her one-sided account16 of prior debates
on intervention. The discussion is confused by the fact Arbour conflates interven-
tion in general with the specific invocation of a ‘right of humanitarian interven-
tion’. Arbour claims that ‘intervention is the prerogative of the intervener and has
always been exercised as such, thereby creating a hierarchy among those who
received protection and those whom the potential interveners could afford to
ignore’.17 Formulating the problem in such general terms means that Arbour is
never forced to confront non-intervention as the corollary of sovereignty. But
intervention has been proscribed between fully-fledged sovereign states since at
least the mid-eighteenth century, as seen in ‘the doctrine of the equal rights of
states to sovereignty, and of their duty of non-intervention’ propounded by
Christian Wolff and Emmerich de Vattel.18
Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, is more specific than a general
right to intervention: the claim made by its advocates is that there exists a ‘right’
to intervene in other states in conditions of extreme human suffering and duress.
Although proscribed by the very idea of sovereignty, intervention has remained the
prerogative of states insofar as the rights of states cannot be ‘actualised [. . .] in a
universal will with constitutional powers above [states], but [only] in their own
particular wills’, as G. W. F. Hegel put it.19 What Hegel means is that in the
anarchic conditions of the international realm, the clash of rights between states is
also always a collision of political wills: the two are inextricably intertwined. As we
shall see, the ‘responsibility to protect’ mystifies the inner link between the exercise
of a state’s right and a state’s will.
By presenting the doctrine as an onerous imposition on would-be interveners
Arbour glosses the fact that the status of the potential ‘recipient’ of international
‘assistance’ is ratcheted down a notch. For if the responsibility to protect could
potentially force would-be interveners to account for their non-action in a
particular context, it most certainly forces the state being intervened in to defend
16 One-sided insofar as Arbour claims that ‘neither the advocates nor the detractors of humanitarian
intervention gained a definitive upper hand’ in the debate (ibid., p. 447). If there is any truth to this
claim, it is less to do with the fact that the legal arguments were equally robust on both sides as
much as the fact that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention won the support of a minority of
rich and powerful Western nations. To hold that a right of intervention has become an accepted part
of international law is to discard a key principle of customary law: that it must be accepted evenly
by a majority of its subjects, as pointed out by Jennifer Welsh: ‘non-Western legal opinion opposes
this interpretation of the customary law on intervention, since it seems to suggest that certain types
of practice count more than others – that is, the actions of Western states versus the stated
opposition from those such as China, Russia, and India.’ Jennifer Welsh, ‘Taking Consequences
Seriously; Objections to Humanitarian Intervention’, in Jennifer Welsh (ed.), Humanitarian Inter-
vention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 55.
17 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 447.
18 Hedley Bull, ‘Introduction’, in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986), p. 4.
19 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 368. Emphasis in original.
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why it is entitled to be free from external interference.20 The doctrine of
humanitarian intervention at least recognises intervention as vice by paying
homage to the virtue of non-intervention: the so-called ‘right’ to breach the
sovereignty of another state is an exception that requires heavy justification.21 By
annulling the presumption of non-interference the doctrine of the responsibility to
protect goes further. Taking away the right to non-intervention is like the erosion
of civil liberties in domestic politics or revoking the presumption of innocence in
criminal law.22 To be sure, in the international realm eroding the presumption of
non-intervention shifts the burden of justification on to a state rather than an
individual. Nonetheless, it is no less invidious a principle.
For once states must justify their political authority to external powers, this
means they are no longer solely legitimate by virtue of the people that they
represent. A people’s right to political representation is effectively made conditional
on international license.23 In the words of Amitai Etzioni, rendering sovereignty
conditional in this manner blasts open ‘a gaping hole’ in the ‘foundation of
democratic theory’: ‘Sovereignty as responsibility [. . .] creates a democratic deficit
that cannot be ignored’.24 Second, this duty does not eliminate the problem of state
prerogative (recall that Arbour singled this out as undermining the credible use of
humanitarian force). Arbour’s claim that the ‘responsibility to protect’ is a
‘concurrent’ burden that falls evenly on all states does not withstand scrutiny.25
For a duty to be ‘effectively claimable’ there must be a specific agent to whom we
can turn in circumstances where we wish the duty to be upheld.26 This is what
Kok-chor Tan calls the ‘agency condition’: a duty can only be actualised through
a particular agent.27 Of all the varied iterations of the ‘responsibility to protect’,
not a single formulation of the doctrine to date is able succinctly to express and
logically demonstrate that there is a single, identifiable agent formally obligated
to act or intervene in a particular situation. There is no ‘automaticity’ in the
doctrine – no governmental machinery or legislation that spontaneously comes into
effect once the ‘duty’ is breached by a state.28
Imperfect duties and the problem of agency
Arbour is at least tacitly aware of this ‘agency condition’, as is shown by her
speculation about ‘States’ lack of resistance regarding the responsibility to protect’.
20 The argument here builds on that originally developed by David Chandler in ‘The Responsibility to
Protect? Imposing the “Liberal Peace”’, International Peacekeeping, 11:1 (2004), pp. 59–81.
21 For an example of this type of argument, cf. Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 228–99.
22 For a treatment of the dangers of this move in the domestic sphere, cf. Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four
Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 10 (2006),
p. 241.
23 Peter Gowan, ‘The New Liberal Cosmopolitanism’, in Daniele Archibuigi (ed.), Debating Cosmo-
politics (London and New York: Verso, 2003), p. 52.
24 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’, Orbis (Winter 2006), p. 72.
25 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 454. Not least because, as we shall see, Arbour contradicts
this claim later when she suggests that the doctrine exacts greater duties from powerful states.
26 Tan, ‘The Duty to Protect’, p. 86.
27 Ibid., p. 96.
28 This problem is linked to the impossibility of articulating in advance the criteria to judge when the
‘responsibility to protect’ has been breached. See Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and
the problem of military intervention’, International Affairs, 84:4 (2008), p. 148.
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She muses whether the rapid uptake of the doctrine may be because states perceive
it to be a ‘merely moral or political’ obligation; that is, the consequences resulting
from ‘a failure to discharge’ the duty only being ‘of limited’ if not ‘altogether
negligible’ concern to ‘the [. . .] duty bearers’ in question.29 Arbour tries to get
around this problem of agency in several ways. But, as we shall see, the contortions
to which she submits her argument in order to render an imperfect duty obligatory
show that her original instinct was the right one: the responsibility to protect can
only be an imperfect duty offering plenty of advantages to states and exacting
‘altogether negligible’ political costs.
First, in keeping with other formulations of the doctrine, Arbour claims that
this ‘permanent duty’ should be seen ‘as a function of sovereignty’: the first agent
to whom we turn to claim the duty is the incumbent state ruling over the
population and territory in question.30 But this duty is not an absolute but a
relative one, because the doctrine clearly holds that states bear responsibilities for
‘human protection’31 that diffuse and overlap across the planet’s whole population.
This is the only way to ensure that there exists the possibility of turning to other
agents to uphold the ‘responsibility to protect’ should an incumbent state fail
to do so. But, because it is everyone’s duty it is also no one’s duty.32 Making the
duty an imperfect one is, perversely, the only way of saving the duty from
evaporating completely in the decentralised political system that is the international
realm.
This has several further consequences. First, pace Arbour’s earlier claims, in an
international order where there is a widely accepted but nebulous responsibility to
protect, we are still firmly in the realm of state prerogative. The ‘permanent’ but
imperfect ‘responsibility to protect’ will only be actualised if states choose to do so.
As Michael Walzer put it, ‘There is no avoiding state action and therefore no
avoiding state politics.’33 What this means is that for all the talk of ‘responsibility’
the doctrine does not limit state prerogatives. Quite the opposite: the doctrine gives
states enhanced flexibility and opportunity to interfere in other states’ affairs.
Indeed, insofar as the doctrine openly countenances coercion, it can be seen as a
de facto extension of the right to wage war.
While the responsibility to protect does differ from discretionary intervention,
it is not in the way that Arbour would have us believe. By tapping into an
international consensus over the ‘responsibility to protect’, states can act on
their own prerogative while claiming a legitimacy that goes beyond their rights
as sovereign states. Specifically: invoking the ‘responsibility to protect’ allows
states to claim they are acting on behalf of humanity itself. Humanitarian
intervention has been attacked for its Manichean potential to normalise
aggression and exacerbate conflict through the criminalisation of all political
29 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 450.
30 Ibid., p. 448.
31 This peculiarly cold and sterile phrase comes from the ICISS report. ICISS, The Responsibility to
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa:
International Development Research Center, 2001), p. viii.
32 In Kok-chor Tan’s words, ‘if the duty to protect is to be a perfect duty, there must be the additional
condition that an agent capable of performing the duty be identified and assigned the responsibility
to act’ – Tan, ‘The Duty to Protect’, p. 86.
33 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. xiv.
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opposition.34 Yet the ‘responsibility to protect’ goes further still. Even if justified
in the most grandiloquent terms,35 a ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ is still
linked to the state(s) making the claim, with all the political costs and deterrents
that come with claiming such a ‘right’ (such as arousing suspicion of self-serving
motives). As the ‘responsibility to protect’ is elevated from a right that can be
claimed by states to a disembodied duty that states can enforce at their own
discretion, it offers all the potential for abuse as does a cosmopolitan ‘right of
intervention’, but with fewer political costs.36
In terms of the potential beneficiaries of intervention, the fact that the
‘responsibility to protect’ is an imperfect duty means that it offers no guarantees
to the wretched of the earth – the oppressed that the doctrine claims to defend
against predatory or indifferent states. For in the end, all the doctrine can really
offer is the vague assurance that remote foreign powers may involve themselves in
a conflict if it happens to be convenient for them to do so. Worse, by virtue of
being enshrined as a permanent duty the ‘responsibility to protect’ could cruelly
raise expectations of outside support that have little hope of ever being fulfilled.
Indeed, the danger also exists that the less specific the assurance of internation-
alised ‘human protection’, the greater the possibility that it may also prolong
existing conflicts by encouraging belligerents to continue fighting in order to secure
international intervention in their favour.37 The doctrine may even encourage
opportunistic secession and insurgency, generating the very conflicts that it
purports to suppress.38
Arbour’s second move to actualise the imperfect duty is to argue that the
failure to discharge the duty has ‘legal implications and consequences’, which may
even constitute ‘a separate actionable harm’.39 In other words, the imperfect duty
can be actualised because states can be held to account through legal mechanisms
if they fail to act to halt abusive behaviour. Arbour argues that ‘the heart of the
responsibility to protect doctrine’ rests on an extant and undisputed obligation of
international law – the prevention and punishment of genocide as codified in the
Genocide Convention’.40
This is peculiar on the face of it, because if the doctrine adds no substantial
value to the provisions of existing international law, why bother spending so much
34 Cf. Mitchell Dean, ‘Military Intervention as “Police” Action?’, in Markus D. Dubber and Mariana
Valverde (eds), The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and International Governance
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 196–200 and passim.
35 Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, famously described the 1999 war over
Kosovo as ‘a battle between good and evil; between civilisation and barbarity; between democracy
and dictatorship’. Blair, cited in Philip Hammond, ‘The rise of the laptop bombardier’, Spiked Online
(24 March 2009).
36 The idea that the ‘responsibility to protect’ imposes costs in terms of duties of post-conflict
engagement and reconstruction is dealt with below.
37 A danger that is even acknowledged in the ICISS report, though not by Arbour (cf. fn. 40 below).
For the reality of this effect see Alan Kuperman ‘Strategic Victimhood in Sudan’, The New York
Times (31 May 2006).
38 This danger is recognised by the ICISS report (ICISS, Responsibility to Protect, p. 25).
39 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 450.
40 Ibid. Arbour weakens her claim by expanding it to include the statutes of the international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda – institutions notorious for their disastrous legal
credentials and breach of ‘every norm of impartiality’. Alberto Toscano, ‘Sovereign Impunity’, New
Left Review, 50 (March–April 2008), p. 132. See more generally John Laughland, Travesty: The Trial
of Slobodan Miloševic´ and the Corruption of International Justice (London: Pluto Press, 2006).
Unfortunately the problems with international criminal law are beyond the scope of this article.
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time defending mere rhetoric? On the preventive side, Arbour turns to the findings
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina vs.
Serbia. Arbour cites the Court’s findings that Serbia failed in its legal obligation
to prevent genocide given the manifold links it had with the 1992–1995 war in
neighbouring Bosnia.41 The various parameters used by the Court to assess the
scope of Serbia’s obligations range from geographic proximity to the strength of
political links between the perpetrators of the crimes in Bosnia and the Serbian
state. Arbour uses this judgement as the basis from which to extrapolate to the
preventive duties of ‘neighbouring and regional states’ and those states who have
‘pre-eminence, global reach and capabilities’.42 Let us examine these two claims in
turn.
In the first case, we have good grounds to query Arbour’s conclusions about
the responsibilities of neighbouring states. Even if we accept the Court’s findings
against Serbia, this could be turned against Arbour’s conclusions. As is well
known, the various relations on which the Court based its judgement relate to wars
that arose from the disintegration of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia
in 1991. Indeed, the conflict itself was about the rights of secession of the various
nations of Yugoslavia. Countries that previously formed a single larger country
immediately prior to a conflict will obviously have far more links than countries
that have no such history. For this reason, the highly exceptional circumstances
surrounding the links between the ex-republics of former Yugoslavia seems a
dubious basis on which to extrapolate to the appropriate behaviour and mutual
relations of all neighbouring states throughout the world. Here again, Arbour is
giving states greater leeway to involve themselves in their neighbours’ affairs.
Granting regional states the ‘responsibility’ not only to prevent genocide using ‘all
such tools as are at a State’s disposal’ but even to ‘deter’ potential perpetrators of
such crimes (that is, to pre-empt genocide)43 gives remarkable scope to regional
states to intervene in their neighbours’ affairs.44
This is quite apart from the larger questions of how international law or the
findings of the ICJ can be upheld against powerful states, particularly given, as we
shall see, the leeway that Arbour seems happy to grant to powerful states. Indeed,
citing a ruling by which one of Europe’s weakest, poorest and most isolated states
was prosecuted by an international court is not a particularly convincing model to
underpin a new era of equitable global law enforcement. In any case, Arbour
clearly realises that calling for good neighbourly relations and drubbing small
states into submission with international law is insufficient to make the ‘responsi-
bility to protect’ genuinely actionable. This is apparent in the fact that Arbour is
keen to prevent geographic distance being used as an excuse by remote countries
to exonerate themselves from having to take action. Hence she broadens the links
that could count as ‘actionable’ far beyond mere geographic proximity to
41 We have no prima facie reason to join Arbour in accepting the Court’s ruling as just, but the justice
or otherwise of the Court’s ruling is not directly relevant to the argument that I want to pursue here.
42 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 453.
43 As David Chandler observes of such arguments in a different context: ‘Armed with the ability to “to
identify the early stages of genocide” [. . .] to judge “murderers before they kill”, it would seem highly
likely that the demand for military-led [. . .] interventions will rely more on prejudice than objective
“justice”.’ David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International
Intervention (London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 189.
44 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 453.
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encompass ‘relevant links of all kinds: historic, political, economic’.45 Perhaps it is
hoped that the more responsibility is shared around, the greater the likelihood that
someone will take action. But the very need to promiscuously share the duty as
much as possible speaks to the intractable character of the agency problem in the
first place.
Sure enough, Arbour is forced to fall back on power to ensure that the
responsibility to protect can be realised. Hence she makes ‘pre-eminence’ and
‘global reach and capabilities’ the basis for apportioning greater responsibilities in
upholding the global duty. Indeed, Arbour is happy to go beyond even the vast
powers invested in the permanent five members of the UN Security Council. She
suggests that:
being better positioned to avert and respond to atrocities may have as much to do with the
capacity to project power and mobilise resources beyond national and regional borders as
with physical proximity. In this respect [. . .] powerful States may be reasonably expected to
play a leading role in bolstering appropriate measures of prevention, dissuasion and remedy
across a geographic spectrum commensurate with their weight, reach and advanced
capabilities.46
By this stage in her argument, Arbour’s claim amounts to little more than the
principle that undermines all law and justice – that ‘might makes right’. She has
granted powerful states the de facto right to police weaker states, up to and
including the use of force. Here we have again returned to the discretionary ‘rights’
of states to interfere in other states’ affairs – the very condition that the
‘responsibility to protect’ was supposed to move us beyond.
Despite Arbour clothing her argument in the language of ‘duties’ and ‘burdens’
the way in which she expressly singles out powerful states for a special role shows
that this doctrine does not curb powerful states but actually augments their power.
It can be said in Arbour’s defence that she is at least consistent in following the
logic of the ‘responsibility to protect’ to its conclusion. Relaxing the normative
presumption against intervention always privileges powerful states, because it is
precisely these states that are capable of projecting power across borders. The
result is that the international hierarchy of power will subvert the already fragile
and decaying edifice of formal international equality.47
As Arbour seems unconcerned about elevating powerful states over the rest, it
is worth reminding ourselves of why formal standards of international equality are
valuable. Once we use different (that is, unequal) standards to judge different
groups of states and to accord greater rights to groups of powerful states, we adopt
a self-referential account of political order. Without an antecedent conception of
formal (legal) equality, inequality becomes its own explanation. The more that the
structure of formal norms reflect real inequalities of wealth and power, the more
entrenched these real inequalities become.The end-result is described by Benedict
Kingsbury: ‘The outcome seems likely to be the maintenance of a classificatory
system which is itself both an explanation and a justification for those at the
45 Ibid., p. 454.
46 Ibid., p. 455.
47 On the erosion of international equality in recent years throughout international law, cf. Benedict
Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds), Inequality,
Globalisation and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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margins remaining there for generations.’48 The distinctive features of the ‘inferior’,
failing category of states is used to explain their very inferiority. Arbour’s struggle
with the implications of the ‘agency condition’ leads her from a half-heated
invocation of international law to an embrace of power and the principle of ‘might
makes right’.
Arbour’s blithe attitude towards international equality is complemented by an
equally derisory treatment of what she calls ‘the element of information’. After
briefly genuflecting to the ‘notion of presumption of innocence’, Arbour pours
scorn on the idea that information regarding atrocities may be uneven, suspect or
contradictory.49 She points out that ‘perpetrators’ will manipulate and poke holes
in the information concerning atrocities in order to stave off an international
response. She claims that the demand for ‘unassailable evidence’ is ‘altogether
preposterous in an age of high-speed communications and sophisticated fact-
finding technologies’.50 Given the record of media compromise witnessed in recent
conflicts Arbour’s faith in the existence of ‘high-speed communications’ seems
naïve, to put it mildly. British journalist Maggie O’Kane famously describes how
the media were manipulated by the British and American armed forces in the 1991
Gulf War: ‘This is a tale of how to tell lies and win wars, and how we, the media,
were harnessed like 2,000 beach donkeys and led through the sand to see what the
British and US military wanted us to see in this nice clean war.’51
In any case, as is hopefully clear by now, the real problems with the
‘responsibility to protect’ do not lie with the issue of information or the lack
thereof, or in the fact that information technology can be manipulated. The real
problem is that the doctrine itself is regressive. The problem of agency does not
just vitiate the ‘responsibility to react’, but also ‘the commitment to rebuild’.52
Much like the putative focus on victims is said to elevate the ‘responsibility to
protect’ above humanitarian intervention, so too the emphasis on ‘post-conflict
engagement’ – or the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ in the language of the ICISS
report – is equally flagged up as a crucial new advance inaugurated by the doctrine.
According to Arbour, the latter forms ‘an integral part of protection rather than
an afterthought’. In this way, the new norm is believed to bar ‘both quick fixes and
even quicker exit strategies’.53
But once the restraints imposed on interventionism are relaxed by emplacing
the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a global and permanent duty, so it makes sense to
diffuse the mechanisms for post-conflict governance. If intervention can be pursued
for the collective purposes of the international community, it is only logical that
no single state should bear the burden of transitional administration. As difficult
as it is to specify an agent obliged to uphold the responsibility to protect, so it is
just as difficult to identify a single agent responsible for overseeing post-conflict
48 Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, p. 91.
49 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 455.
50 Ibid. Whether this means that we have more unassailable evidence due to global telecommunications,
or that we should relax our demand for firm evidence due to an overwhelming proliferation (of
potentially contradictory) reports, is unclear.
51 Maggie O’Kane, ‘How to tell lies and win wars’, The Guardian (16 December 1995). Cf. more
generally on the issue of the media in humanitarian intervention, Philip Hammond (ed.), Degraded
Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
52 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 448.
53 Ibid.
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populations and territories. Instead in the ‘new humanitarian empire’54 there is ‘no
territorial center of power [. . .] fixed boundaries or barriers [. . .] The distinct
national colours of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in
the imperial global rainbow.’55 In practice this means that direct political
responsibility for transitional territories can be avoided. Roland Paris raises
concerns about the ‘networked’ character of political authority in today’s
transitional administrations and peacebuilding operations. According to him, by
virtue of being ‘decentralized and lacking a single corporate identity’ –
international governance structures lack clear lines of accountability, meaning that even if
we [. . .] disapproved of the actions of the network of international agencies engaged in
peacebuilding, there is no single mechanism through which we could demand a change of
peacebuilding policy. Nor is there a single actor whom we could collectively hold
responsible for the outcome of a particular operation.56
Sovereignty and responsible government
Having prised open the ‘problem of agency’ at the core of the doctrine, it is now
incumbent on me to take my critique further by following the problem back to its
source.57 This problem of agency that vitiates the whole structure of the
responsibility to protect can be traced back to its founding assumption – its erosion
of the authority of the sovereign state. In Arbour’s words, ‘sovereignty is not
absolute in an interdependent world’.58
The problem here is the misconception engendered by the term ‘absolute
sovereignty’ – a rhetorical construct that blurs the issues more than it clarifies
them. The ICISS report sagely observed that talk of humanitarian intervention
tends to ‘prejudge the issue in question’ by assuming that the intervention in
question must be humanitarian and any opposition inhumane by default.59 The
54 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London; Vintage,
2003), p. 17.
55 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press,
2000), pp. xii–xiii. Hardt and Negri’s description is evocative even if their explanatory power is
limited. Cf. Scott McLemee, ‘Empire Burlesque’, Book Forum (Dec/Jan 2009).
56 Roland Paris, ‘Broadening the Study of Peace Operations’, International Studies Review, 2:3 (2000),
p. 43.
57 One frequently mooted solution to the ‘agency condition’ is a standing cosmopolitan or
humanitarian defence force independent of state interests. While such proposals are beyond the
scope of the article, one observation can be made, apart from questions of their improbability. It
is far from clear that proposals for standing cosmopolitan forces of whatever variety would go much
further in resolving the ‘ageny condition’. On the contrary, such a force could exacerbate the agency
problem, as is suggested by John T. O’Neill and Nicholas Rees:
A [standing] force of this kind would very likely be regarded as a mercenary body willing to, and
capable of, performing any kind of military task. Since no [. . .] state would bear direct political
responsibility for it, everyone would opt out of obligations and frivolously call for its deployment
in any small conflict around the world. Far from the answer to global concerns, a UN Foreign
Legion would be another excuse for [. . .] states to do nothing. (UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold
War Era, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 205).
Although O’Neill and Rees are surveying proposals for a standing UN peacekeeping force, the issue
would be the same for a standing humanitarian defence force (in any case, there are now significant
humanitarian expectations placed upon UN peacekeepers – cf. Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to
Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), pp. 159–60).
58 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 448.
59 ICISS, Responsibility to Protect, p. 9.
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same could be said of ‘absolute sovereignty’:60 it prejudges the issue in question by
suggesting that the absolute monopoly of power is at once untenable in an era of
globalisation and morally dubious as a quasi-totalitarian concentration of power.
But the idea of ‘absoluteness’, as far as it is related to sovereignty, is nothing to
do with totalitarianism. This is emphasised by Martin Loughlin:
The absolutist aspect of sovereignty lies in danger of being misunderstood; it can properly
be understood only from the perspective of law. Since sovereign authority is expressed
through those established institutional forms which enable the general will to be articulated,
that general will, although absolute, has nothing in common with the exercise of an
arbitrary power. Sovereign will is the antithesis of subjective [individual] will.61
The ‘absoluteness’ of sovereign power is ‘absolute’ insofar as it is related to the
binding force of law, which emerges from the relationship between the institutional
framework of the state and the people of the state, the latter being the ‘constituent
power’ that generates the ‘constituted power’ of the state.62 Sovereignty is not
about the form of government (democracy, dictatorship, monarchy) nor about the
institutions which exercise power (bureaucracy, parliament) but about ‘the rela-
tionship of political power to other forms of authority’.63 The fact that sovereign
power is supreme, with no higher constituted power above it, asserts the
pre-eminence of public authority, and with it the autonomy of the political
sphere.64 The ‘absoluteness’ or ‘impunity’ of sovereignty is often tendentiously
described as if it existed merely to allow states to perpetrate genocide against their
people.65 But if to be sovereign is to act as one pleases, then sovereignty enshrines
the freedom of the people that the state represents, to structure their collective
affairs as they see fit.
Sovereignty preserves the freedom of a people to be self-determining, not the
impunity of the state apparatus. To erode or call into question ‘absolute
sovereignty’ is to erode or call into question the idea of representative government
and the self-determination of nations. As sovereignty inheres in the relationship
between people and state, once it is properly understood then the idea of
sovereignty already answers the question of who should alleviate human suffering
or stamp out gross abuses of human rights: it is the people themselves who must
impose their will on the state. If the ‘absoluteness’ of sovereignty alienates a
potentially awesome power of oppression to the state, the dialectic of sovereignty
contains within itself the potential to check and overthrow tyranny. It is a concept
that relates people to state and subdues the latter to the former. ‘People power’ is
a meaningless slogan in the absence of sovereignty. Without effort it is possible to
60 Another variant on this theme is ‘traditional’ or ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty. Though the epithets may
vary, they function in essentially the same way.
61 Martin Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’, in Neil Hart (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2003), p. 73. Emphasis added.
62 On the relational character of political power, Loughlin notes ‘The relational aspect of the political
conception of sovereignty is mainly concerned with elaborating the ways in which constitutional
arrangements serve state-building purposes. This feature of political sovereignty is the product of the
peculiarly communal character of political power, which requires that individuals act in concert.’
Ibid., p. 71.
63 James Sheehan, ‘Presidential Address: The Problem of Sovereignty in European History’, The
American Historical Review, 111:1 (2006), p. 1. Cf. also Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’, p. 68.
64 On the autonomy of the political, see Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’, p. 56.
65 Louis Henkin, for example, criticises this caricatured portrayal of sovereignty: ‘Kosovo and the Law
of “Humanitarian Intervention”’, American Journal of International Law, 93:4 (1999), pp. 824–48.
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bring to mind historical examples of when people have risen up against even the
most fearsome and unjust of tyrannies. Indeed, the Franco-American revolutions
of the eighteenth century that advanced universal human rights as a political force
were precisely examples of such struggles for popular self-determination.
The real issue then is not whether states are responsible to their citizens – this
is after all given in the very idea of modern political representation. What becomes
clear is that under the banal talk of ‘state responsibilities’ the responsibility to
protect doctrine is calling into question people’s capacity for and rights of
self-determination. Small wonder that ‘victims’ occupy such an important place in
the doctrine. As we saw previously, the emphasis on the victims of international
politics is celebrated as the strong point of the doctrine.66 No more of the unseemly
squabbling and shenanigans of states, the doctrine’s supporters say, and instead let
us focus on the practical problem of alleviating human suffering. But we have no
reason to accept the ‘ideology of victimization’ at face value.67 Quite the opposite:
we would be naïve not to be at least initially sceptical when we hear the powerful,
the great and the good declaiming for the rights of the powerless.
Indeed, it is revealing that the intended beneficiaries and constituents of the
doctrine have to be assumed to be politically passive. Victims by their very nature
are weak and pliable, offering exceptional political advantage to those who would
seek to represent them. After all, the weak and powerless have difficulty holding
their putative benefactors to account. To paraphrase Marx, what is appealing
about victims as a political constituency is that ‘They cannot represent themselves,
they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as
their master, as an authority over them, [. . .] that protects them [. . .] and sends
them rain and sunshine from above.’68 What is true in general is even truer of the
international sphere, where there exists no machinery of cross-border government
that would enable the victims of a particular conflict to hold the government of
another intervening country to account in any meaningful way. Indeed, in certain
cases international interveners have not only assumed the political passivity of their
intended beneficiaries, they have actively imposed it. NATO’s support for the
human rights of Kosovars during the war of 1999 came at the expense of the
self-determination for which the Kosovo Liberation Army was fighting (Kosovo
was administered as a UN-NATO protectorate from 1999 to 2008, and remains a
ward of the international community to this day).69 It would seem that the victims
of conflict are good enough to be flattered by august international conventions and
UN resolutions, but not it seems, good enough to be granted self-government.
While Arbour openly recognises that the doctrine gives powerful states greater
leeway to coerce smaller powers, what she does not recognise is that it also gives
states greater freedom from accountability to their own peoples. This returns to the
‘gaping hole’ that the doctrine tears open in the structure of democratic politics.
For once the principle is established that states must uphold a certain standard to
66 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 448.
67 The phrase is taken from Slavoj Žižek, ‘NATO: the Left Hand of God?’, Nettime (29 June 1999).
68 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1934),
p. 109. Marx is here relating the form of Louis Napoleon’s mid-nineteenth century dictatorship to
the socio-political fragmentation and weakness of the French peasantry that supported him.
69 Even today, nominally independent Kosovo is an international protectorate. Cf. Philip Cunliffe,
‘Kosovo: the obedient child of Europe’, Spiked Online (18 February 2008).
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which they may be held to account by outside institutions and other states, this
cannot but have the effect of making the people less central to a state’s political
choices. Perversely, being forced to take greater account of the international
community does not strengthen a state’s commitment to its own people so much
as granting states the opportunity to distance themselves from their people’s
demands and interests, by citing the pressures and responsibilities owed to the
international community. In short, the doctrine of the responsibility to protect
establishes the insidious principle that states hold responsibilities for their people
more than to their peoples. For a doctrine that invites us to be suspicious of state
power, it is peculiar on the face of it that it offers such clear opportunities for
states to entrench their powers at the expense of popular accountability. But this
is the logic of a doctrine that expands responsibilities without accountability:
paternalism.
Lest it be thought that these concerns only apply to those states ‘which may
assume that they could be targets of intervention’, Arbour’s internationalised duty
of care also has consequences for domestic politics in those ‘countries that would
most likely be the potential interveners’.70 The ‘responsibility to protect’ not only
lowers the justification necessary for any state to mount an intervention in the
international realm, but also in the domestic sphere. Embedding the possibility of
intervention as a duty of generalised ‘human protection’ provides governments with
a ready means of quashing domestic opposition to foreign crusades – doubtless a
prospect that would appeal to the likes of former British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, who infamously insisted that the invasion of Iraq was the ‘right thing to do’
regardless of the expressed will of his people.71 The more that states bear diffuse
and abstract duties to all people, the more they are able to evade responsibility to
a concrete people.
Sovereignty and intervention reconsidered
Where does all this leave the issue of offering people an additional bulwark of
(international) protection from ‘state-sponsored slaughter’? What of circumstances
when self-help is not possible, where there is no popular domestic movement or
organised political opposition of sufficient strength to overthrow an oppressive
regime or halt systematic atrocities? Is it possible to take cross-border action to
halt ‘gross violations of human rights’ without compromising the imperative of
popular sovereignty and self-determination? What is certain is that it is always
possible to concoct hypothetical scenarios in the abstract, in which the case for
intervention is unarguable. Concrete crises are always more complex and contra-
dictory than those dreamt up in ‘what if?’ scenarios.72 Nonetheless, as Martin
70 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 450.
71 Philip Webster, ‘Tony Blair: “I wanted war – it was the right thing to do”’, The Times (17 November
2007).
72 Indeed, the formation of institutions and policy around the precautionary principles of preparing for
extreme scenarios is a problem in itself – the problem of political exceptionalism that vitiates the
whole debate around intervention and the responsibility to protect. It is incumbent on us to think
through not only how we should respond to exceptional scenarios, but also in the words of Jef
Huysmans, reflect on how ‘claims of exceptionality’ function politically. How do such claims
Dangerous duties 93
Wight justly observed, ‘adherents of every political belief will regard intervention
as justified under certain circumstances’.73 Equally it would be dishonest and
remiss not to acknowledge that even those interventions which we may believe to
have been justified under the circumstances are still deeply problematic.74 There is
no avoiding issues of ‘the utmost moral complexity’ in intervention75 – something
which is obliterated in the Manichean vision promulgated by humanitarianism,
which sees only oppressors and victims, good and evil.76
What should be apparent by now is that it is not possible innocuously to insert
this internationalised ‘duty of care’ without distorting the normative edifice of the
international order and warping the structure of representative government. It is
not possible to loosen the normative restraints on intervention – whether conceived
of as the use of military force or ‘milder’ forms of coercion – without impinging
on self-determination and boosting paternalistic forms of political authority.
Intervention should always be proscribed and sovereignty upheld. If these are the
keystones of international order, then even specific instances of intervention or
violations of sovereignty will leave intact the normative value and content of
self-determination as a principle. Recognising that intervention will take place and
may even be necessary in some circumstances is crucially different from making the
case that intervention should be encouraged or facilitated.77
It is possible, without being inconsistent, to uphold non-intervention as a
precondition of sovereignty while also admitting that particular interventions may
be necessary. At the very least, this would have the benefit of honesty:
acknowledging that intervention involves the violation of sovereignty would not
require tortuous and unconvincing arguments about ‘responsibilities’. It would
impose political penalties, preventing states from grandiloquently claiming that
they were acting on behalf of humanity itself. The principle of self-determination
would remain as one from which criticism could be mounted and interveners held
to account.78 It would also by default clarify the responsibilities incumbent on
interveners in any post-conflict period, preventing the flight from political
responsibility witnessed in the networked authorities of today’s transitional
administrations.
This begs the question of course, of whether we live in ‘special times’ – in a
period where human suffering is so dramatic, grave and shocking that we must
discard principled attachments to norms of self-determination, international
‘structure [the] stakes and positions in international struggles for legitimacy and authority?’ – Jef
Huysmans, ‘International Politics of Insecurity: Normativity, Inwardness and the Exception’,
Security Dialogue, 37:1, (2006), p. 12. Alas, for reasons of space, this is a problem that I tackle
elsewhere: Philip Cunliffe, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Practice of Political Exceptionalism’.
Paper presented to LSE Forum in Legal and Political Theory (17 March 2010).
73 Martin Wight, Power Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 191.
74 For example, see Joshua Kurlantzick’s account of the vagaries of the international criminal tribunals
in contemporary Cambodia, and of the legacy of political authoritarianism inherited from the
Vietnamese occupation of that country. Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘In Pol Pot Time’, London Review of
Books (6 August 2009).
75 Wight, Power Politics, p. 191.
76 For a critique of this reflexive depiction of a conflict in Manichean terms, cf. Mahmood Mamdani,
‘The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency’, London Review of Books (8 March 2007).
77 The way in which one proposition segues into the other is usually through claims for political
exceptionalism. Cf. fn. 66 above.
78 This is the argument advocated by Simon Chesterman. Cf. f n. 21 above.
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equality and anti-imperialism and simply accept the routine violation of sover-
eignty.79 This belief, in many variants, is the corollary assumption that shadows all
discussion of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. As David
Chandler observes, ‘Most human rights books start with stories of genocide, mass
rape, ethnic cleansing, and torture, to emphasise the urgency of their cause.’80
Arbour herself begins her article by citing ‘a proliferation of devastating internal
wars’ that unfolded across the 1990s.81 Are these justifiable depictions of today’s
international order? The claims of the ‘neo-barbarism’ school – the idea that
conflicts in the developing world today are disproportionately violent and brutal –
have now been subjected to extensive and penetrating criticisms, so there is no need
to recapitulate such criticisms here.82 In any case, there is always the point that the
focus of humanitarian concern is notoriously partial: some cases of human rights
violations receive international attention while others do not.
The point is not to draw attention to the hypocrisy that may underlie any
particular humanitarian claim. Rather the inconsistency should alert us to the fact
that there is something else that intercedes between identifying a focus for
humanitarian compassion and maintaining the international duty of care which
Arbour enjoins us to do. As Slavoj Žižek observes,
The death of a West Bank Palestinian child, not to mention an Israeli or an American, is
mediatically worth thousands of times more than the death of a nameless Congolese. Do
we need further proof that the humanitarian sense of urgency is mediated, indeed
overdetermined, by clear political considerations?83
Despite the hysteria surrounding the threats posed by failed states and ‘new wars’,
as the 2005 Human Security Report has shown, levels of global violence have been
declining from the early 1990s, including both inter – and intra-state conflict.84 All
of this suggests that the rise of the ‘responsibility to protect’ cannot be
straightforwardly justified or mechanically attributed to a rise in the levels of
conflict, violence or human suffering, as this rise has simply not happened. As Jon
Holbrook noted long before the Human Security Report was published, ‘The point
is not that there are no humanitarian crises: there are. But [. . .] the existence of
human suffering cannot explain the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention.’85
Nor is the argument about globalisation or interdependence any more straight-
forward: ‘Pressures on Western governments to respond to humanitarian crises
existed before the 1991 relief operation in northern Iraq. What needs to be
explained is why Western governments did not, until 1991, translate these pressures
into coercive action’.86
79 The question of whether or not we accept a particular claim made for political exceptionalism is not
necessarily the same as providing an account of why claims are systematically advanced in the form
of political exceptionalism. The latter is beyond the scope of this article. Cf. fn. 66 above.
80 Chandler, Kosovo to Kabul, p. 232.
81 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 446.
82 See Chapter 5 in Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development
and Security (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001).
83 Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (London: Profile Books, 2008), p. 3.
84 Human Security Report. Available: {http://www.humansecurityreport.info} accessed 9 August 2009.
85 Jon Holbrook, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Recasting of International Law’, in David
Chandler (ed.), Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 139.
86 Ibid.
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The argument that we have increasing recourse to intervention as a result of
enhanced levels of international violence does not hold up. If anything, recent
international history is remarkable for its relative calm and stability more than
anything else.87 This gives us no reason of historic exceptionality to jettison
sovereignty and self-determination. Instead these facts should prompt us to
reconsider the context for the rise of humanitarian intervention and the ‘responsi-
bility to protect’. If we cannot attribute these norms to greater levels of
international violence, then we must root it in the changing political order –
Western victory in the Cold War, economic globalisation and the subsequent
struggles between the developing and developed worlds.88 Locating this as the
context for the responsibility to protect sheds a very different light on how we
understand and approach the doctrine.
Conclusion
Arbour celebrates the responsibility to protect as a means of bolstering the
international legal defences available to the wretched of the earth. She presents the
doctrine as offering important normative advances on the problems posed by
humanitarian intervention. But Arbour misdiagnoses the problems of humanitarian
intervention, and in so doing, simply reproduces the real problems of interven-
tionism in her defence of the responsibility to protect. The problem remains that
of the violation of state sovereignty involved in intervention, and the concomitant
violation of self-determination. The responsibility to protect remains as discretion-
ary a prerogative as humanitarian intervention. At the most, the doctrine can only
offer vague assurances to the victims of world politics, who in any case are
assumed to be politically passive and apathetic, prostrate before the mercy of both
their oppressors and their benefactors.
Where the responsibility to protect does differ from humanitarian intervention,
it is for the worse. The responsibility to protect does not merely ensconce coercion
in relations between states; it also has the potential to distort the structure of
representative government within states. It further erodes the presumption of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, thereby calling into question the
very foundation of representative government, by making such government
conditional on international license. At the international level, the promotion of
the responsibility to protect yields all the advantages of intervention to the
powerful states that are likely to wield it, with fewer political costs. Invoking a
‘permanent’ duty allows states to claim a higher legitimacy than their own political
will in pursuit of their aims. As the doctrine enhances power with no countervailing
check, we can only reach the conclusion that the doctrine will have the effect of
making the exercise of power less responsible. The doctrine fosters the paternalism
of strong states over weak states and of states over their peoples. Perversely,
instead of disciplining states in favour of the wretched of the earth, states are given
further justification to slip out of the grasp of popular accountability.
87 For example, cf. Raimo Väyrynen, The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates (Oxford, New
York: Routledge, 2006).
88 See the ‘Foreword’ in the ICISS’ Responsibility to Protect.
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